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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The Supreme Court of Utah has jurisdiction over this 
appeal by virtue of Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3) (j) . 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
1. Whether the trial court erred in concluding that 
Plaintiff Ed Ingram (hereinafter Mr. Ingram) made an 
election of remedies to pursue his breach of contract claim 
under Count One of his Amended Complaint, which precluded 
him from recovering statutory damages under Count Four. A 
trial court's conclusions of law are reviewable for 
correctness. Ron Case Roofing & Asphalt Paving, Inc. v. 
Blomquist, 773 P.2d 1382, 1385 (Utah 1989). This issue was 
preserved in Plaintiff's Reply in Support of Motion for 
Entry of Judgment. (R. 0316-0323) 
2. Whether the trial court erred in concluding that 
Mr. Ingram's entitlement to recover compensatory damages 
under Count One of his Amended Complaint qualifies as 
"payment made prior to Entry of Judgment" under section 
11.(b) of the Settlement Agreement entered into by the 
parties, which precludes Mr. Ingram from recovering 
compensatory damages under Count Four., A trial court's 
conclusions of law are reviewable for correctness. Ron Case 
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Roofing & Asphalt Paving, Inc. v. Blomquist, 773 P. 2d 1382, 
1385 (Utah 1989). Contract interpretation is a question of 
law reviewed without deference to the trial court. Nova 
Cas. Co. v. Able Constr., Inc., 1999 UT 69, 16, 983 P.2d 
575. This issue was preserved in Plaintiff's Memorandum in 
Support of Motion for Entry of Judgment. (R. 0280-0290) 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTE 
Utah Code Ann. § 7-15-1 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
I. Nature of the Case 
This is an appeal from a final order of the Third 
Judicial District Court of Summit County. 
II. Statement of Facts 
1. Mr. Ingram's Amended Complaint asserts four claims 
for relief: (a) Count One asserts a claim for breach of 
contract against Defendant Brian Kitts (hereinafter Mr. 
Kitts) in the amount of $54,790.04 based upon Mr. Kitts' 
failure to pay for labor and material supplied by Mr. Ingram 
for the improvement of Mr. Kitts' residence; (b) Count Two 
asserts a claim for lien foreclosure in accordance with Utah 
Code Ann. § 38-1-7; (c) Count Three asserts a claim against 
Mr. Kitts for lost profits in the amount of $18,015.00; and 
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Count Four asserts a claim against both Mr. Kitts and 
Defendant Sunpeak Holdings, Inc. (hereinafter Sunpeak) under 
Utah Code Ann. § 7-15-1 based upon two checks which Mr. 
Kitts issued to Mr. Ingram which were returned to Mr. Ingram 
stamped "NSF." The damages prayed for in Count Four include 
the face amount of the NSF checks ($5,840.00 and $13,405.07, 
respectively), returned check charges in the amount of 
$40.00, reasonable attorney fees, and statutory damages in 
the amount of $20,245.07 in accordance with Utah Code Ann. § 
7-15-1. (R. 0050-0063) 
2. Both of the NSF checks at issue in Count Four of 
the Amended Complaint were delivered to Mr. Ingram as 
partial payment for the labor performed and material 
supplied for which Mr. Ingram also seeks to recover 
compensatory damages in Count One. (R. 0372) 
3. A bench trial was scheduled in this action for 
February 19, 2003. (R. 0267) 
4. On February 18, 2003, the day before trial, Mr. 
Ingram entered into a Settlement, Release and Indemnity 
Agreement (hereinafter the "Settlement Agreement") with Mr. 
Kitts and Sunpeak, pursuant to which Mr. Kitts and Sunpeak 
promised to pay Mr. Ingram the sum of $68,757.26 on or 
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before March 19, 2003. (R. 0283-288) 
5. Paragraph 11.b. of the Settlement Agreement 
provides that "[i]n the event Kitts and Sunpeak fail to pay 
Ingram the Settlement Amount as agreed in Section 11.a. 
herein, Ingram shall be entitled to judgment against Kitts 
and Sunpeak as prayed for in the Amended Complaint, less 
sums paid by Kitts and Sunpeak to the date of entry of 
judgment." (R. 0284-0285) 
6. Mr. Kitts and Sunpeak failed to make the required 
payment. (R. 0280) 
7. Accordingly, on April 17, 2003, Mr. Ingram filed a 
Motion for Entry of Judgment in which he requested that 
judgment be entered against Mr. Kitts and Sunpeak as prayed 
for under the four Counts of his Amended Complaint in 
accordance with Section 11.b. of the Settlement Agreement. 
(R. 0279-0290) 
8. Mr. Kitts and Sunpeak filed a Memorandum in 
Opposition to Motion for Entry of Judgment on April 29, 
2003. In their memorandum, Defendants argued, inter alia, 
that: 
(a) Mr. Ingram was not entitled to recover both 
compensatory damages under Count One and also statutory 
4 
damages under Count Four of the Amended Complaint. 
According to Defendants, recovery of both compensatory 
damages and statutory damages would amount to a double 
recovery and, therefore, that Mr. Ingram should be 
required to elect his remedy under either Count One or 
Count Four. 
(b) Mr. Ingram's entitlement to judgment for 
compensatory damages under Count One of the Amended 
Complaint qualifies as "sums paid by Kitts and Sunpeak 
to the date of entry of judgment" within the meaning of 
paragraph 11.b. of the Settlement Agreement, thereby 
precluding an award of compensatory damages under Count 
Four of the Amended Complaint. 
(R. 0294-0309) 
9. Mr. Ingram filed a Reply in Support of Motion for 
Entry of Judgment in which he argued that not only does the 
Settlement Agreement specifically provide for the entry of 
judgment "as prayed for in the Amended Complaint," but UCA § 
7-15-1 specifically provides for recovery of both 
compensatory and statutory damages. Mr. Ingram also pointed 
out that there is no double recovery because the 
compensatory damages which he is entitled to recover under 
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Count Four have been subtracted from those which he is 
entitled to recover under Count One. (R. 0316-0323) 
10. Following a hearing held May 28, 2003, the trial 
court sustained Defendants' objection and denied Mr. Ingram 
recovery of statutory damages under Count Four. (R. 0327-
0328) 
11. An Order sustaining Mr. Kitts' objection (R. 0371-
0377) and a Judgment in favor of Mr. Ingram (R. 0378-0380) 
were both entered on June 30, 2003. On that same date, the 
trial court also issued a Rule 54 Certification certifying 
both the Judgment and the Order as final in accordance with 
Rule 54(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. (R. 0381-
0382) 
12. Mr. Ingram timely filed his Notice of Appeal on 
July 18, 2003. (R. 0401-0402) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Mr. Ingram was not required to elect his remedies 
because he does not seek a double recovery. See Royal 
Resource v. Gibralter Fin. Corp., 603 P.2d 793, 796 (Utah 
1979)("[t]he doctrine of election of remedies is a technical 
rule of procedure and its purpose is not to prevent recourse 
to any remedy, but to prevent double redress for a single 
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wrong"). Pursuant to the parties' Settlement Agreement, Mr. 
Ingram was entitled to the entry of judgment "as prayed for 
in the Amended Complaint..." (R. 0284) Count One of the 
Amended Complaint seeks compensatory damages of $54,790.04. 
Count Four seeks compensatory damages of $19,245.07 and 
statutory damages in the amount of $20,245.07 in accordance 
with § 7-15-1, U.C.A. If Mr. Ingram was asking for both the 
full amount of compensatory damages prayed for in Count One 
($54,790.04) and the full amount of compensatory damages 
prayed for in Count Four ($19,245.07) that might1 amount to 
a double recovery to the extent of $19,245.07. However, Mr. 
Ingram is only asking for $29,704.97 in compensatory damages 
under Count One and $19,245.07 in compensatory damages under 
Count Four totaling $48,950.04. Thus, there is no double 
recovery because Mr. Ingram has subtracted the compensatory 
damages which he is entitled to recover under Count Four 
from those which he is entitled to recover under Count One. 
Also erroneous is the trial court's conclusion that Mr. 
Ingram's entitlement to recover compensatory damages under 
Count One qualifies as "payment made prior to Entry of 
x25 Am Jur 2d § 18, p. 779 ("If the remedies are 
alternative and concurrent, there is no bar until 
satisfaction has been obtained"). 
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Judgment" under section 11.b. of the Settlement Agreement, 
which precludes Mr. Ingram from recovering compensatory 
damages under Count Four. Neither Mr. Kitts nor Sunpeak has 
ever made any payment to Mr. Ingram in accordance with the 
Settlement Agreement either before or after the entry of 
Judgment. 
ARGUMENT 
I. MR. INGRAM WAS NOT REQUIRED TO ELECT HIS REMEDY BECAUSE 
HE DOES NOT SEEK A DOUBLE RECOVERY. 
The trial court ruled that Mr. Ingram is precluded from 
recovering both compensatory damages under Count One of the 
Amended Complaint and statutory damages under Count Four 
because to do so would amount to a "double recovery." That 
is clearly not the case. The Settlement Agreement entered 
into by the parties provides that Mr. Ingram is entitled to 
judgment against Mr. Kitts "as prayed for in the Amended 
Complaint." (R. 0284) Count One of the Amended Complaint 
seeks compensatory damages of $54,790.04. Count Four seeks 
compensatory damages of $19,245.07 and statutory damages in 
the amount of $20,245.072 in accordance with § 7-15-1, 
U.C.A. If Mr. Ingram was asking for both the full amount of 
2Count Four also seeks returned check fees of $40.00, 
interest, and attorney fees. 
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compensatory damages prayed for in Count One ($54,7 90.04) 
and the full amount of compensatory damages prayed for in 
Count Four ($19,245.07) that might amount to a double 
recovery to the extent of $19,245.07. However, Mr. Ingram 
is only asking for $29,704.973 in compensatory damages under 
Count One and $19,245.07 under Count Four totaling 
$48,950.04. 
In short, there is no double recovery because Mr. 
Ingram has subtracted the compensatory damages which he is 
entitled to recover under Count Four from those which he is 
entitled to recover under Count One. Accordingly, the 
doctrine of election of remedies is not applicable to this 
case. See Royal Resource v. Gibralter Fin. Corp., 603 P.2d 
793, 796 (Utah 1979) ("[tjhe doctrine of election of remedies 
is a technical rule of procedure and its purpose is not to 
prevent recourse to any remedy, but to prevent double 
redress for a single wrong"); Brigham City Sand v. Machinery 
Center, 613 P.2d 510 (Utah 1980)(same); and Angelos v. First 
Interstate Bank of Utah, 671 P.2d 772 (Utah 1983)(same); see 
also, 25 Am Jur 2d § 18, p. 779 ("The doctrine of election 
of remedies does not apply if the available remedies are 
3$54,790.04 minus $5,840 (previously paid by Mr. Kitts to 
Mr. Ingram) minus $19,245.07 equals $29,704.97. 
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consistent and concurrent or cumulative. If the remedies 
are alternative and concurrent, there is no bar until 
satisfaction has been obtained"). 
Finally, § 7-15-1 specifically provides that, in 
addition to compensatory damages, a successful plaintiff is 
entitled to recover statutory damages: 
(A) equal to the greater of: 
(I) $100.00; 
or (II) triple the check amount; and 
(B) not to exceed the check amount plus $500. 
U.C.A. § 7-15-1(7)(b)(vi). 
Accordingly, Mr. Ingram is entitled to recover 
compensatory damages in the amount of $29,704.97 under Count 
One of his Amended Complaint, as well as both compensatory 
damages in the amount of $19,245.07 and statutory damages in 
the amount of $20,245.07 under Count Four of his Amended 
Complaint. 
II. A JUDGMENT AWARDING DAMAGES IS NOT THE SAME AS 
RECEIPT OF "PAYMENT." 
The trial court also concluded that Mr. Ingram's 
entitlement to recover compensatory damages under Count One 
qualifies as "payment made prior to Entry of Judgment" under 
section 11.b. of the Settlement Agreement, which precludes 
Mr. Ingram from recovering compensatory damages under Count 
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Four. Mr. Ingram respectfully submits that this conclusion 
is clearly false. Section 11.b. of the Settlement Agreement 
was obviously intended to provide Defendants with credit for 
any payment which they made to Mr. Ingram toward the 
settlement amount of $68,727.56. Defendants, however, have 
never paid any of the $68,757.26 which they agreed to pay 
under the Settlement Agreement and an award of damages is no 
closer to "payment" than a bird in the bush is to one in the 
hand. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, Mr. Ingram respectfully 
requests that the trial court's June 30, 2003 Order be 
reversed to the extent that it denies Mr. Ingram judgment in 
accordance with Count Four of the Amended Complaint and that 
this action be remanded to the trial court with instructions 
for the entry of judgment in Mr. Ingram's favor for 
statutory damages in the amount of $20,245.07, returned 
check fees of $40.00, interest, and attorney fees incurred 
both before the trial court and in connection with this 
appeal. 
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DATED this 27 day of April 2004 
>rney for Appellant 
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BRIAN KITS; SUNPEAK HOLDINGS, 
INC.; WASHINGTON MUTUAL BANK 
fsb ABC Corporation I-V; XYZ Partnerships 
I-V; and John Does I-V; 
Defendants. 
ORDER 
Case No.: 010500400 LM 
Judge: Bruce Lubeck 
Plaintiffs Motion for Entry of Judgment and Defendants5 Objections thereto came on for 
hearing before the Honorable Bruce Lubeck, Third District Court Judge presiding on Tuesday, 
May 28, 2003 at the hour of 9:00 o'clock am. Scott B. Mitchell appeared on behalf of Plaintiff. 
E. Paul Wood appeared on behalf of Defendants Brian Kitts and Sunpeak Holdings, Inc. Dairen 
K. Nelson appeared on behalf of Defendant Washington Mutual Bank. The Court, having 
considered the Memoranda submitted by the parties, the pleadings on file with the Court, and the 
arguments of counsel, herewith enters its Findings and Conclusions as follows: 
1. Plaintiff Ed Ingram filed an Amended Complaint stating four claims for relief: 
Count I alleges breach of contract based upon Defendants' failure to pay for labor 
performed and materials supplied on the improvement of the Defendant's real 
property having a reasonable value of Fifty Four Thousand Seven Hundred Ninety 
Dollars and 04/100ths ($54,790.04); Count II, requests foreclosure of a mechanics 
lien; Count III requests payment of fifteen percent (15%) profit of the 
compensatory damages alleged in Count I in an amount equal to Eighteen 
Thousand Fifteen Dollars ($18,015.00); and Count IV, requests statutory damages 
under Section 7-15-1 Utah Code Ami, for two insufficient funds checks drawn on 
the account of Defendants, check no. 181 in the amount of Thirteen Thousand Four 
Hundred Five Dollars and 07/100ths ($13,405.07) which, by its terms, is payable 
for "Lumber and Permit" and check no. 182 in the amount of Five Thousand Eight 
Hundred Forty Dollars ($5,840.00), payableby its temis for "Deposit Windows and 
Tile" ("the Checks"). 
2/ The Checks were written for labor performed and material supplied for which 
Ingram seeks recovery of compensatory damages under Count I. 
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Ingram and Defendants Kitts and Sunpeak Holdings, Inc. entered a Settlement 
Agreement whereby Kitts and Sunpeak Holdings, Inc. agreed to pay Sixty Eight 
Thousand Seven Hundred Fifty Seven Dollars and 26/100ths ($68,757.26) on or 
before March 19,2003. 
Paragraph 11 .(b) of the Settlement Agreement sets forth the remedy for the failure 
to pay: 
"Ingram shall be entitled to Judgment against Kitts and Sunpeak 
as prayed for in the Amended Complaint, less sums paid by 
Kitts and Sunpeak to the date of Entry of Judgment." 
Kitts and Sunpeak failed to pay the agreed upon settlement amount by the stated 
date. 
Ingram filed a Motion forEntry of Judgment seeking payment under all four claims 
set forth in the Amended Complaint. 
Defendants Kitts and Sunpeak Holdings, Inc. opposed Entry of Judgment for 
statutory damages under Count IV on the following theory: 
a. Plaintiffs Count 1 for breach of contract includes compensatory damages 
for labor and materials for which Kitts/Sunpeak Holdings, Inc. wrote the 
Checks which failed to clear the bank. Section 7-15-1 Utah Code Ann, 
requires recovery of compensatory damages for the face amount of the 
Check as a condition of awarding statutory damages. Plaintiff Ingram 
3 
elected the remedy of pursuing Judgment for compensatory damages under 
Count I in the amount of Fifty Four Thousand Seven Hundred Ninety 
Dollars and 04/] OOths ($54,790.04) which would preclude recovering of 
compensatory damages under Count IV for the insufficient funds Checks. 
Under the legal principle of election of remedies, Ingram is precluded from 
recovering statutory damages under Section 7-15-1 Utah Code Ann. 
b. The language of the Settlement Agreement allows Entry of Judgment 
against Kitts and Sunpeak "less sums paid by Kitts and Sunpeak to date of 
Entry of Judgment." Ingram will recover compensatory damages for labor 
performed and materials supplied under Count I of the Amended Complaint 
which qualifies as "sums paid by Kitts and Sunpeak to the date of Entry of 
Judgment" and prohibit also awarding compensatory damages under Count 
IV for the insufficient funds Checks. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. In the Amended Complaint, Plaintiff Ingram elected to pursue and recover 
compensatory damages for labor performed and materials supplied under a theory 
of breach of contract set forth in Count I seeking compensatory damages in the 
amount of Fifty Four Thousand Seven Hundred Ninety Dollars and 04/1 OOths 
($54,790.04). 
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The Checks were written by Kitts and Sunpeak Holdings, Inc. for materials which 
were part of the materials for which Ingram seeks compensatory damages under 
Count! 
Pursuant to Section 7-15-1 Utah Code Ann, under Count IV, Ingram, must be 
awarded compensatory damages for the face amount of the Checks in order to be 
awarded statutory damages. 
Ingi'am made an election of remedies to pursue the breach of contract theory under 
Count I for which Ingram will recover compensatory damages in the amount of 
Fifty Four Thousand Seven Hundred Ninety Dollars and 04/100ths ($54,790.04), 
which includes the face amount of the Checks. As a result, Ingram is not entitled 
to recover under Count IV on his claim for statutory damages for the insufficient 
funds Checks. 
Additionally, Ingram's recovery of compensatory damages under Count I for labor 
performed and materials supplied is "payment made prior to Entry of Judgement" 
by Kitts and Sunpeak Holdings, Inc. under section 11.(b) of the Settlement 
Agreement which precludes recovery of compensatory damages under Count IV 
relating to Section 7-15-1 Utah Code Ann, for compensatory damages for the face 
value of the Checks. 
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ORDER 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that: 
1. Defendant's objection to Entry of Judgment is sustained. 
2. Recovery under Plaintiffs Count IV of the Amended Complaint is denied. 
3. Plaintiffs counsel is directed to revise the proposed Judgment consistent with the 
terms hereof and submit the same for approval. 
DATED this Qfc> day of June, 2003. 
By the Court: 
hi 
Bruce Lubeck 
District Court Judge 
Approved as to form: 
Sobtt B. Mitchell, Esq. 
Ahopney for Ed Ingram 
By: Darren K. Nelson, Esq. 
Attorneys for Washington Mutual Bank 
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7-14-1 FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS 188 
CHAPTER 14 
CREDIT INFORMATION EXCHANGE 
Section 
7-14-1. Definitions. 
7-14-2. Legislative findings. 
7-14-3. Information an institution may furnish. 
7-14-4. Immunity from liability. 
7-14-5. Reciprocal exchange of information authorized. 
7-14-1. Definitions. 
As used in this chapter: 
(1) "Depository institution" means any institution au-
thorized by state or federal law to accept and hold demand 
deposits or other accounts which may be used to effect 
third party payment transactions. The definition of "de-
pository institution" in Chapter 1 does not apply to 
Chapter 14. 
(2) "Credit reporting agency" includes any co-operative 
credit reporting agency maintained by an association of 
financial institutions or one or more associations of mer-
chants. 1995 
7-14-2. Legis lat ive findings. 
The substantial financial loss to the state and to trade and 
commerce within this state resulting from the dishonor or 
other re turn of checks, drafts, or other orders for the payment 
of money, including transactions to be consummated by elec-
tronic means, requires concerted effort by financial institu-
tions to at tempt to minimize the number of such occurrences. 
The Legislature finds tha t to facilitate such concerted effort 
adequate protection against liability of the participating fi-
nancial institutions is necessary. 1981 
7-14-3. Information an inst i tut ion may furnish. 
Any institution doing business in the state may report to 
any other financial institution, or credit reporting agency the 
following: 
(1) that an account maintained to effect third party 
payment transactions has been closed out by the institu-
tion, the reasons therefor, and the identity of the depositor 
or account holder; 
(2) upon the request of another financial institution 
any other information in the files of the institution relat-
ing to the credit experience of the reporting institution 
with respect to a particular person as to whom inquiry is 
made; and 
(3) any information concerning attempted or potential 
activity to defraud a financial institution or to obtain 
funds from a financial institution by fraudulent or other 
unlawful means or other information relating to individu-
als sought by law enforcement authorities for alleged 
violations of criminal laws. 1981 
7-14-4. Immunity from liability. 
No depository institution making any report or communica-
tion of information authorized by this chapter shall be liable to 
any person for disclosing such information to any recipient 
authorized to receive this information under this chapter, or 
for any error or omission in such report or communication. 
1981 
7-14-5. Reciprocal exchange of information autho-
rized. 
One or more financial institutions may jointly agree with 
one or more other financial institutions for the reciprocal 
exchange of any information authorized to be reported by the 
provisions of this chapter. Such reciprocal exchange of infor-
mation or the acts or refusals to act of one or more recipients 
because of such information shall not constitute a boycott or 
blacklist, or otherwise be a basis for liability to any person on 
the part of any participant in the reciprocal exchange of 




7-15-1. Definitions — Civil liability of issuer — Notice of 
action — Collection costs — Exemptions. 
7-15-2. Notice — Form. 
7-15-3. Liability of financial institution upon wrongful dis-
honor. 
7-15-1. Definitions — Civil l iability of issuer — Notice 
of action — Collection costs — Exemptions. 
(1) As used in this chapter: 
(a) "Check" means a payment instrument on a deposi-
tory institution including a: 
(i) check; 
(ii) draft; 
(iii) order; or 
(iv) other instrument. 
(b) "Issuer" means a person who makes, draws, signs, 
or issues a check, whether as corporate agent or other-
wise, for the purpose of: 
(i) obtaining from any person any money, merchan-
dise, property, or other thing of value; or 
(ii) paying for any service, wages, salary, or rent. 
(c) "Mailed" means the day that a notice is properly 
deposited in the United States mail. 
(2) (a) An issuer of a check is liable to the holder of the 
check if: 
(i) the check: 
(A) is not honored upon presentment; and 
(B) is marked "refer to maker"; 
(ii) the account upon which the check is made or 
drawn: 
(A) does not exist; 
(B) has been closed; or 
(C) does not have sufficient funds or sufficient 
credit for payment in full of the check; or 
(iii) (A) the check is issued in partial or complete 
fulfillment of a valid and legally binding obliga-
tion; and 
(B) the issuer stops payment on the check 
with the intent to: 
(I) fraudulently defeat a possessory lien; 
or 
(II) otherwise defraud the holder of the 
check. 
(b) If an issuer of a check is liable under Subsection 
(2)(a), the issuer is liable for: 
(i) the check amount; and 
(ii) a service charge of $20. 
(3) (a) The holder of a check that has been dishonored may: 
(i) give written or oral notice of dishonor to the 
issuer of the check; and 
(ii) waive all or part of the service charge imposed 
under Subsection (2Kb). 
(b) Notwithstanding Subsection (2)(b), a holder of a 
check that has been dishonored may not collect and the 
issuer is not liable for the service charge imposed under 
Subsection (2Kb) if: 
(i) the holder redeposits the check; and 
(ii) tha t check is honored. 
(4) If the issuer does not pay the amount owed under 
Subsection (2)(b) within 15 calendar days from the day on 
189 FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS 7-15-2 
which the notice required under Subsection (5) is mailed, the 
issuer is liable for: 
(a) the amount owed under Subsection (2Kb); and 
(b) collection costs not to exceed $20. 
(5) (a) A holder shall provide written notice to an issuer 
before: 
(i) charging collection costs under Subsection (4) in 
addition to the amount owed under Subsection (2)(b); 
or 
(ii) filing an action based upon this section, 
(b) The written notice required under Subsection (5)(a) 
shall notify the issuer of the dishonored check that: 
(i) if the amount owed under Subsection (2)(b) is 
not paid within 15 calendar days from the day on 
which the notice is mailed, the issuer is liable for: 
(A) the amount owed under Subsection (2)(b); 
and 
(B) collection costs under Subsection (4); and 
(ii) the holder may file civil action if the issuer does 
not pay to the holder the amount owed under Subsec-
tion (4) within 30 calendar days from the day on 
which the notice is mailed. 
(6) (a) If the issuer has not paid the holder the amounts 
owed under Subsection (4) within 30 calendar days from 
the day on which the notice required by Subsection (5) is 
mailed, the holder may offer to not file civil action under 
this section if the issuer pays the holder: 
(i) the amount owed under Subsection (2)(b); 
(ii) the collection costs under Subsection (4); 
(in) an amount that: 
(A) is equal to the greater of: 
(I) $50; or 
(II) triple the check amount; and 
(B) does not exceed the check amount plus 
$250; and 
(iv) if the holder retains an attorney to recover on 
the dishonored check, reasonable attorney's fees not 
to exceed $50. 
(b) (i) Notwithstanding Subsection (6)(a), all amounts 
charged or collected under Subsection (6)(a)(iii) shall 
be paid to and be the property of the original payee of 
the check. 
(ii) A person who is not the original payee may not 
retain any amounts charged or collected under Sub-
section (6)(a)(iii). 
(hi) The original payee of a check may not contract 
for a person to retain any amounts charged or col-
lected under Subsection (6)(a)(iii). 
(7) (a) A civil action may not be filed under this section 
unless the issuer fails to pay the amounts owed: 
(i) under Subsection (4); and 
(ii) within 30 calendar days from the day on which 
the notice required by Subsection (5) is mailed. 
(b) Subject to Subsection (7)(c) and (d), in a civil action 
the issuer of the check is liable to the holder for: 
(i) the amount owed under Subsection (2)(b); 
(ii) the collection costs under Subsection (4); 
(hi) interest; 
(iv) court costs; 
(v) reasonable attorneys' fees; and 
(vi) damages: 
(A) equal to the greater of: 
(I) $100; or 
(II) triple the check amount; and 
(B) not to exceed the check amount plus $500. 
(c) If an issuer is held liable under Subsection (7)(b), 
notwithstanding Subsection (7)(b), a court may waive any 
amount owed under Subsections (7)(b)(iii) through (vi) 
upon a finding of good cause. 
(d) If a holder of a check violates this section by filing a 
civil action under this section before 31 calendar days 
from the day on which the notice required by Subsection 
(5) is mailed, an issuer may not be held liable for an 
amount in excess of the check amount. 
(e) (i) Notwithstanding Subsection (7)(b), all amounts 
charged or collected under Subsection (7)(b)(vi) shall 
be paid to and be the property of the original payee of 
the check. 
(ii) A person who is not the original payee may not 
retain any amounts charged or collected under Sub-
section (7)(b)(vi). 
(iii) The original payee of a check may not contract 
for a person to retain any amounts charged or col-
lected under Subsection (7)(b)(vi). 
(8) This section may not be construed to prohibit the holder 
of the check from seeking relief under any other applicable 
statute or cause of action. 
(9) (a) Notwithstanding the other provisions of this section, 
a holder of a check is exempt from this section if: 
(i) the holder: 
(A) is a depository institution; or 
(B) a person tha t receives a payment on behalf 
of a depository institution; 
(ii) the check is a payment on a loan tha t origi-
nated at the depository institution that: 
(A) is the holder; or 
(B) on behalf of which the holder received the 
payment; and 
(iii) the loan contract states a specific service 
charge for dishonor. 
(b) A holder exempt under Subsection (9)(a) may con-
tract with an issuer for the collection of fees or charges for 
the dishonor of a check. 2002 
7-15-2. Notice — Form. 
(1) (a) "Notice" means notice given to the issuer of a check 
either orally or in writing. 
(b) Written notice may be given by United States mail 
tha t is: 
(i) first class; and 
(ii) postage prepaid. 
(c) Notwithstanding Subsection (l)(b), written notice is 
conclusively presumed to have been given when the notice 
is: 
(i) properly deposited in the United States mail; 
(ii) postage prepaid; 
(iii) certified or registered mail; 
(iv) return receipt requested; and 
(v) addressed to the signer at the signer's: 
(A) address as it appears on the check; or 
(B) last-known address. 
(2) Written notice under Subsection 7-15-1(5) shall take 
substantially the following form: 
Date: 
To: 
You are hereby notified that the check(s) described below 





Reason for dishonor (marked on check): 
In accordance with Section 7-15-1, Utah Code Annotated, 
you are liable for this check together with a service charge of 
$20, which must be paid to the undersigned. 
If you do not pay the check amount and the $20 service 
charge within 15 calendar days from the day on which this 
notice was mailed, you are required to pay witliin 30 calendar 
days from the day on which this notice is mailed: 
